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Abstract: 
Previous literature has shown mixed results on the role of female participation on bank boards and bank 
performance: some find that more women on boards enhance financial performance, while others find 
negative or no effects. Applying Instrumental Variables methods to data on approximately 90 US bank 
holding companies over the 1999-2015 period, we argue that these inconclusive results are due to the fact 
that there is a non-linear, U-shaped relationship between gender diversity on boards and various measures 
of bank performance: female participation has a positive effect once a threshold level of gender diversity is 
achieved. Furthermore, this positive effect is only observed in better capitalized banks. Our results suggest 
that continuing the voluntary expansion of gender diversity on bank boards will be value-enhancing, 
provided that they are well capitalized. 
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1. Introduction 
Women are heavily underrepresented in leadership positions in financial services, where they generally 
remain in lower-paying first or mid-level positions. While women made up 54.3 percent of the workforce 
at S&P 500 finance companies in 2014, only 18.7 percent of S&P 500 finance company boards and only 
2.1 percent of CEOs were women (Catalyst, 2015). Many papers have studied the impact of boards’ gender 
composition on firm performance and a few have studied it in the banking industry specifically (Adams 
and Mehran, 2012; Garcia-Meca et al, 2015; Berger et al, 2014; Pathan and Faff, 2013), showing mixed 
results.  We study this issue using a newly compiled annual dataset on the leadership and financial 
performance of approximately 90 U.S. banks over the 1999-2015 period. We propose the resolution to these 
conflicting findings is that the impact of greater gender diversity depends on bank and board characteristics.  
We find significant non-linearities in the relationship between bank performance and board gender 
composition. Our findings suggests that the impact of gender diversity changes as it increases and is 
dependent on the quality of bank management. 
Specifically, we identify a “threshold” effect, which indicates that gender diversity on bank boards 
must reach a certain level before its performance benefits accrue.  Furthermore, we find that the impact of 
greater gender diversity on boards varies, depending on what measure of performance is used.   These 
findings have important policy implications, suggesting that banks’ continued voluntary expansion of board 
gender diversity is likely to bring overall performance benefits, provided that the banks are well managed 
(capitalized).  
Our data and methods also allow us to advance the current literature on this topic.  We conduct our 
analysis on a newly compiled dataset on approximately 90 U.S. bank holding companies boards’ gender 
composition, and these banks’ financial performance and balance sheet characteristics over the 1999-2015 
period. We constructed this dataset from Boardex, Compustat/CRSP and Bankscope. This dataset provides 
a broader cross-section and longer time-series than most related papers. We address the potential 
endogeneity of gender diversity by employing an Instrumental Variables estimation method. We also 
include broad sets of fixed effects (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Adams and Mehran, 2012).  Finally, by 
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focusing our analysis on institutions that share many similarities, the largest U.S. banks, we are able to 
mitigate concern about omitted variables that could generate variation in performance in a more diverse 
group of firms.  Overall, we find that banks with more females on their board perform better once they 
reach a critical level of gender diversity, corresponding to a female share of around 13-17 percent on the 
board. Given the size and composition of most boards, this result essentially means that adding more women 
to the board improves overall performance if there is already at least one woman on the board; adding the 
first woman to the board does not have this positive effect. This implies that currently about half of the 
banks in our sample enjoy the performance-enhancing effects of gender diversity on their boards.   
We find that greater gender diversity of well-capitalized banks also increases the risk on their 
books. Specifically, greater gender diversity corresponds to a higher share of nonperforming assets once 
the female share of board reaches around 7-8 percent, (corresponding to three-quarters of the banks in our 
sample). This finding is consistent with the previous literature (Berger et al, 2014; Wang and Hsu, 2013). 
A potential explanation is that board (gender) heterogeneity leads to increased communication costs, which 
interfere with the board’s monitoring function (Wang and Hsu, 2013).  
Our analysis makes several important contributions to the existing literature on board diversity.  
First, our findings help to reconcile the mixed evidence obtained to date.  Generally, the results on the 
impact of gender diversity on firm performance run the gamut, from those that find a positive impact on 
performance (Gul et al., 2011; Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2008; Noland et al., 2016; Kang et al., 2009; 
Schmid and Urban, 2016) to those that find a negative impact (Ahern and Dittmar, 2012; Adams and 
Ferreira, 2009), to those that find little or no impact (Farrell and Hersch, 2004; Ferrari et al., 2016).  While 
some previous papers documented evidence of non-linearities regarding some performance measures (de 
Andres and Vallelado, 2008), our study is first in providing comprehensive evidence that the impact of 
board gender diversity on performance depends on how much diversity the board has already achieved and 
on how well-managed the institution is overall. Our “threshold” result, which shows that the direction of 
the relationship between bank performance and gender diversity flips signs as the share of females on the 
board increases, helps to reconcile the very mixed findings of previous papers.   
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Of course, all of the previous literature studies firm performance in a specific context.  Our 
“threshold” results indicate that this diversity of findings may be due to the particular sample and period 
under study – that is, whether the authors’ samples showed female participation above or below the critical 
“threshold”.  Furthermore, our study is the first to provide empirical evidence that better managed 
institutions are better able to reap the benefits of diverse perspectives, perhaps by reducing the 
communication costs of board heterogeneity.  For example, we find that an increase in gender diversity 
increases return on assets at well-capitalized banks, but decreases it at low-capitalized banks.  Previous 
studies that do not condition on the quality of management found mixed results in this literature. 
In what follows, we describe our methods and contribution in greater detail.  Section 2 describes 
the data and Section 3 presents the estimation methodology. Section 4 discusses the estimation results. 
Section 5 summarizes and concludes the paper. 
2. Data Description  
We collect data on bank boards from Boardex. Our data covers the 1999-2015 period, with annual 
frequency. Boardex provides coverage of a total of 168 U.S. banks for the 17 years in our sample. Our 
unbalanced panel consists of just above 1,600 bank-year observations on board composition. We collect 
balance sheet data for the banks in our sample from Bankscope, Compustat and CRSP. We match the 
Boardex data to the balance sheet characteristics using banks’ ISIN identifier.  Although we start with a 
sample of 168 banks, we note that in our main estimations, data availability limits our sample to 87 banks. 
In this section, we describe our data in three categories: overall bank performance measures and 
bank behavior, board characteristics and bank characteristics.  Summary statistics for all of the data 
described in this section appear in Table 1. 
2.1 Overall Bank Performance Measures and Bank Behavior 
We focus on two measures of overall bank performance and two measures of more specific bank behavior.  
The first measure of overall performance, Revenue to Expense Ratio, is defined as the ratio of banks’ 
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operating revenue to operating expenses and is our measure of the efficiency of a banks’ operations.2  The 
second overall performance measure, Return on Assets, is defined as net income divided by total assets and 
is included as a measure of banks’ profitability. We also examine risk-taking behavior by using the Share 
of Nonperforming Assets as an indicator of risk – it measures the buildup of risk on balance sheets.3 Lastly, 
we examine practices related to pay equity by looking at the dispersion of compensation within banks with 
the Ratio of CEO to Average Staff Pay. This measure is the ratio of the CEO’s direct and equity-based 
compensation to average staff compensation (including stocks, wages & salaries and benefits).4  
2.2 Board Characteristics 
Our main measure of gender diversity on boards is the Blau Index (Blau, 1977; Bear et al., 2010), defined 
as follows: 
𝐵 = [1 − ∑ 𝑃𝑔
2
𝐺
𝑔=1
] × 100 
In this expression, P is the fraction of women and men on bank boards, and g indexes gender. By 
construction, this measure has a maximum value of 50 at gender equality on boards, i.e. if both men and 
women have 50 percent representation. Lower values of the Blau Index indicate greater gender inequality. 
In auxiliary regressions, we use the Female Share of Board as our dependent variable. By 
definition, this measure is the number of female board members, divided by the total number of board 
members, times 100. As Table 1A shows, our two measures of gender diversity are highly correlated for 
values up to a female board share of 50 percent, and strongly negatively correlated at higher female shares. 
Table 1 reveals that in our sample, the Female Share of Board variable is consistently below 50 percent. 
Therefore, our sample shows a very high positive correlation between the Female Share of Board and the 
Blau Index (Table 1A). 
                                                          
2 This measure is therefore the inverse of the “efficiency ratio” – a common measure of performance in banking. 
3 Note that year fixed effects should control for changes in systemic risk. 
4 The lowest ratios for CEO to staff pay occurred in 2008 and 2009, suggesting that some bank CEOs temporarily 
experienced large reductions in compensation as a result of the financial crisis. 
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The average Female Share of Board is around 12.5 percent, corresponding to one out of eight board 
members being female. This is also the median female share. The median size of a board is 13 board 
members so this means that the typical bank board will have one or two women on it.  However, the 
distribution has a long right tail – while the maximum female share is high at 42.8 percent, three-quarters 
of the boards in our sample have less than 16.8 percent female share. Similarly, the Blau Index distribution 
is concentrated at low values (implying low gender diversity).  That said, gender diversity as measured by 
either the Blau Index or the Female Share of Board has increased over time, with the median Blau Index 
across all banks in a given year increasing from 16% to 25% over the sample period, corresponding to an 
uptick in median Female Share of Board from 8% to 15% (Figure 1). We include two measures to capture 
the average demographic characteristics of the board. First, Average Wealth of Board Members is the 
natural logarithm of the average value (across all board members) of cumulative holdings over time of 
stocks and options. Second, Average Age of Board Members is the natural logarithm of the board members’ 
average age. 
Our board experience measures capture the level and dispersion of board members’ expertise. 
Average Bank Board Tenure captures the (logarithm of) the average number of years that board members 
have spent on bank boards, to date. Across banks and over time, average board experience ranges from 3 
to 12 years, with a mean of around 6 years. Our second experience measure, Average Board Experience is 
the (logarithm of) the average number of company boards (private, quoted or other) that board members 
have served on over their careers, to date. While the average number of boards that board members have 
served on is 5, this measure is as high as 11 for some banks. Lastly, Overall Board Tenure is the (logarithm 
of) the average number of years board members have sat on a board of a publicly listed company, to date. 
The average board experience is around 9 years – but is as high as 22 years for some bank boards.5 We also 
include the spreads of all three experience measures, to capture the dispersion of board members’ expertise. 
                                                          
5 We include the logarithms of these measures in our regressions – therefore, the numbers in the descriptive Table 1 
are the logs of the numbers presented here in the text. 
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For each variable, the spread is defined as the logarithm of the difference between the average and median 
board experience measure, divided by the median value.  
2.3 Bank Characteristics 
Our estimations also include bank balance sheet characteristics as controls for non-board related 
developments that may affect bank performance. The Loan to Deposit Ratio is our measure of bank liquidity 
conditions. Almost all banks in our sample hold less loans than their deposits, with their ratio averaging 
0.9. The Acquisition dummy is included to capture the performance impact of bank M&A activity. With a 
mean of 0.4, we see a significant amount of M&A activity in our sample – consistent with the rapid 
consolidation of the commercial banking industry during the 2000s. Risk-weighted Capital Ratio is our 
measure of a bank’s overall “quality of management”, as suggested by the work of Mehran and Thakor 
(2011) and Bhat and Desai (2016). The banks in our sample are quite well capitalized, with mean and 
median capital ratios between 13 and 14 percent. However, we see a substantial spread in these ratios – 
with some banks very poorly capitalized at 3 to 4 percent, while others extremely well capitalized. We 
explore this variation in the capital ratio in our estimations, as we examine how this variable impacts the 
role of board gender diversity in bank performance. Lastly, we also include Board Size as a control for the 
scale of the board. Board Size ranges from 6 to 32 members, with an average Board Size of 13 members in 
our estimation sample 
3. Estimation methodology  
In our main empirical specifications, we estimate the first-differenced form of the following equation:  
(1)                 𝑌𝑡
𝑏 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑋𝑡−1
𝑏 + 𝛼2(𝑋𝑡−1
𝑏 )2 + 𝐶𝑡−1
𝑏 × [𝛼3𝑋𝑡−1
𝑏 + 𝛼4(𝑋𝑡−1
𝑏 )2]
+ 𝛼5𝑍𝑡−1
𝑏 + 𝛼6𝑆𝑡−1
𝑏 + 𝛼7𝑇𝑡 + 𝛼8𝐵𝑏 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑏 
In Equation 1, 𝑌𝑡
𝑏denotes the measure of bank performance and bank behavior under study, which is one 
of: Revenue to Expense Ratio, Return on Assets, Share of Nonperforming Assets, and Ratio of CEO to 
Average Staff Pay. 𝑋𝑡−1
𝑏  is the (one-year) lagged value of the Blau Index, which is our main gender diversity 
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measure.6 We also include the square of this measure, (𝑋𝑡−1
𝑏 )2, to capture non-linearities in the relationship 
between bank performance and gender diversity. We interact both the Blau Index and its square with the 
Risk-weighted Capital Ratio 𝐶𝑡−1
𝑏 , to examine how the role of gender diversity varies with the quality of 
management.  𝑍𝑡−1
𝑏  is the vector of (lagged) board characteristics7, which include: Average Wealth of Board 
Members, Average Age of Board Members, Average Bank Board Tenure and its Spread; Average Board 
Experience and its Spread, Average Overall Board Tenure and its Spread, and Board Size. The vector of 
(lagged) bank balance sheet characteristics included in 𝑆𝑡−1
𝑏  are:  Loan to Deposit Ratio, Acquisition 
dummy, and the Risk-Weighted Capital Ratio. Furthermore, 𝐵𝑏 and 𝑇𝑡 are the sets of bank and year fixed 
effects.  
Banks with more women on their boards might be fundamentally different from other banks, in 
ways that are not directly observable. We address this issue in Equation 1 in several ways. First, we include 
numerous bank balance sheet characteristics as controls, which capture differences in performance and 
management style. We also include bank and year fixed effects to control for unobservable time-invariant 
bank traits and time-varying shocks common to all banks, respectively.   
We are also concerned about the potential endogeneity of gender diversity because the composition 
of the board may change in response to shocks to bank performance (Fich, 2005; Mateos de Cabo et al., 
2012). For instance, bad returns may result in a “shake-up” of the board, yielding changes in its composition 
as well.  We address this issue with two overall strategies.  First, we use a lagged value of gender diversity 
to predict subsequent bank performance to mitigate the impact of the concern that poor performance in one 
year would cause a change in board composition in the following year. Second, we employ IV specifications 
throughout.  
We use two different types of instruments.  The first is the Share of Independent Directors, defined 
as the share of those board members in the total board whose roles are classified as “independent directors” 
                                                          
6 In auxiliary regressions, we use Female Share of Board as our diversity measure and reach the same qualitative 
conclusions. 
7 We include lagged values of bank characteristics to mitigate the possibility of reverse causality. 
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in the Boardex database.  The Share of Independent Directors is an appropriate instrument because it may 
be associated with more women on the board if it is indicative of banks’ boards being selected from a larger 
pool of qualified professionals rather than a smaller, internally-generated pool.8 Indeed, the data in our 
sample shows that this measure is highly and significantly correlated with the Blau Index and the Female 
Share of Board (as shown in Table 1A in the Appendix).9 However, it shows no additional direct 
relationship with measures of bank performance, as also confirmed by the majority of the previous literature 
(Pi and Timme, 1993; de Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Muller-Kahle and Lewellyn, 2011; Aebi et al, 2012; 
Adams and Mehran, 2012).10 As an additional check, we address the possibility that banks’ reported Share 
of Independent Directors may by subject to managerial manipulation in response to regulations. For 
instance, Bowen (2017) casts doubt on whether or not directors classified as independent are truly 
independent by documenting that in about 13 percent of the firms in his sample, firms reclassified the same 
individuals, switching them from a non-independent to independent directors from one year to the next.  
However, in the sample of bank holding companies that we examine, we find that this behavior is not 
common.  For the entire sample period, we see only 12 instances of reclassification of directors, less than 
one percent of the sample; this broader trend is not evident in our data. 
 The second type of instrument that we use follows the strategy of Ahern and Dittmar (2012).  
Specifically, we use the initial Blau Index (measured in 1999) times year fixed effects.  As we discuss 
further below, Sargan tests support the validity of our instruments. 
As a result of this multiple instrument strategy, the first stage of the IV estimations takes the 
following form: 
(2)                                𝑋𝑡
𝑏 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑡
𝑏 + 𝛽2(𝑋1999
𝑏 × 𝑇𝑡)+𝛽3𝑍𝑡−1
𝑏 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑡−1
𝑏 + 𝛽5𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵𝑏 + ʋ𝑡
𝑏 
                                                          
8 On average, three-quarters of bank boards are made up of independent directors in our sample – but there are a few 
banks with independent director shares of less than one-eighth of the board.   
9 Notably, previous literature has used the Board Size as an instrument for gender diversity (Ferris et al., 2003). We 
choose not to do so, since Vallelado (2008), Faleye and Krishnan (2010), Adams and Mehran (2012) and de Andres, 
and Fernandes and Fich (2016) show that Board Size is significantly related to bank performance. Therefore, we 
include board size as a separate covariate, rather than an instrument for gender diversity. 
10 While Faleye and Krishnan (2010) and Fernandes and Fich (2016) do find a significant relationship, Berger et al 
(2016) conclude that no consistent pattern exists.   
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In Equation 2, 𝐼𝑡
𝑏 denotes the Share of Independent Directors.  The first stage also includes 𝑍𝑡−1
𝑏  (the set of 
bank characteristics from Equation 1), bank and year fixed effects, and year fixed effects times the initial 
Blau Index (measured in 1999) as instruments.  
Finally, insofar as board experience is correlated with gender diversity (Kim and Starks, 2016), 
multicollinearity of the explanatory variables might also pose a problem. While our IV specifications and 
lagging of the explanatory variables by one year (as described above) tackles this issue, we take a further 
step to eliminate multicollinearity by using first-differenced panel estimations (Bear, Rahman and Popst, 
2010). 
4. Estimation Results 
4.1 Bank Performance and Board Gender Diversity 
We first present results for a broad measure of bank performance, the Revenue to Expense Ratio, in Table 
2.  All estimations reported in Table 2 include the Blau Index for gender diversity as well as three interaction 
terms that allow for the impact of gender diversity to vary with bank and board characteristics: the Blau 
Index times the Risk-weighted Capital Ratio, the Blau Index squared, and the Blau Index squared times the 
Risk-weighted Capital Ratio.  All estimations also include bank characteristics that vary over time, as well 
as bank and year fixed effects.  In the various specifications of Table 2, we vary the board characteristics 
across estimations. We also include controls for average age and wealth of board members, and alternate 
controls for experience and variety of experience of board members. Specifically, in estimations in Columns 
3 and 4, to characterize the experience of the board, we use average number of years serving on a bank 
board and the spread between the median and mean years of bank board experience. In Columns 5 and 6, 
we measure experience using the average number and spread of boards of all publicly traded companies, 
and in Columns 7 and 8, we use the average number of years and the spread of years on boards of all 
publicly traded companies. 
 Each column in Table 2 presents the results of the second stage of an instrumental variables (IV) 
estimation.  First stage results, in which we use the Share of Independent Directors and year fixed effects 
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times the initial Blau Index (measured in 1999) as instruments, appear in Appendix Table 2A.11 As expected, 
in the first stage regressions the Share of Independent Directors is positively related to the Blau Index of 
gender diversity.  The R2 of these regressions ranges from 0.41 to 0.45 and a Sargan test of over-identifying 
restrictions cannot reject the validity of the instruments at the 5 percent level in five of the eight 
specifications and at the 10 percent level in all remaining specifications. 
 Turning back to the main results in Table 2, we see that the Blau Index enters significantly and 
positively in all specifications. Importantly, the interaction terms are also statistically significant, some with 
positive coefficients and some with negative coefficients, in all specifications. This indicates that the impact 
of gender diversity of the board on bank performance is more complicated than a simple “level” effect 
suggests. Specifically, the marginal effect of additional gender diversity depends on its existing level and 
on the Risk-weighted Capital Ratio. At the bottom of Table 2, we take all these effects into account and 
calculate the marginal effects of a one standard deviation increase in the Blau Index for well-capitalized 
banks with low (10th percentile) and high (90th percentile) existing gender diversity.  What these results 
show is that for well-capitalized (managed) banks with a low level of gender diversity on the board, a small 
increase in gender diversity has a negative effect on bank performance. However, we show that as the 
gender diversity of the board increases, the evidence of a negative effect disappears. Bank efficiency (as 
measured by the Revenue to Expense Ratio) no longer decreases with gender diversity once the share of 
women on the board reaches around 17 percent at well-capitalized banks (paralleling a Blau Index of around 
27). This corresponds to around the top 25 percent of banks in our sample. 
 Interestingly, the results in Table 2 also provide evidence that experience on boards matters. The 
results for Bank Board Tenure (Columns 3 and 4) and Overall Board Tenure (Column 7 and 8) are similar.  
The negative and significant coefficients for the Spread of both Bank and Overall Board Tenure imply that 
the Revenue to Expense Ratio decreases when the distribution of board experience is skewed in either 
                                                          
11 Note that because the Blau Index appears in the second stage interacted with other variables several times, the full 
set of first stage regressions also includes first stage regressions for all the interaction terms.  Those results as are 
available from the authors upon request. 
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direction.  We do not find evidence, however, that the average years of experience on either bank boards or 
boards of publicly traded companies has an effect on bank performance.  This suggests that board members 
from different “vintages”, that is, with different years of experience may not work as well together in 
providing effective guidance to senior management.  However, in line with the findings of Fernandes and 
Fich (2016) and Cunat and Garicano (2010), bank boards that have directors with experience on multiple 
boards correspond to better bank performance, as suggested by the positive coefficient on Average Board 
Experience in Columns 5 and 6.  Furthermore, dispersion in this measure (as indicated by the Spread of 
Board Experience) is associated with increases in the Revenue to Expense Ratio.  It is possible that there is 
some reverse causality in this measure—if better board members are asked to be on more boards—but, it 
does suggest that banks might benefit from a board that is populated with individuals with broad experience.  
In sum, these results imply that the type of experience that improves bank performance is board experience 
with different firms, not necessarily more years of experience with the same firm or with banks specifically.  
To the extent that men and women may also have different experience or perspective, this experience 
diversity result complements our investigation of the impact of gender diversity.   
 Finally, we note some expected results when we examine the impact of bank characteristics on the 
Revenue to Expense Ratio.  Banks that have a higher Loan to Deposit Ratio and which have made an 
Acquisition in the current year have a lower Revenue to Expense Ratio. Banks with a higher Risk-weighted 
Capital Ratio experience a higher Revenue to Expense Ratio, which supports our interpretation of this 
measure as a proxy of the quality of bank management.   
 We examine another broad measure of bank performance, Return on Assets, in Table 3.  Similar to 
the results in Table 2, we find again that the Blau Index enters positively and significantly in all estimations. 
The results for the interactions of the Blau Index are also all statistically significant with mixed signs on the 
coefficients. This time, however, when we calculate the marginal effect of an increase in the gender 
diversity of the board for well-capitalized banks, we obtain statistically significant effects for banks with 
both low and high existing gender diversity of boards. Specifically, when a well-capitalized bank has low 
gender diversity, a one standard deviation increase in the Blau Index reduces Return on Assets by about one 
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percentage point.  However, when a well-capitalized bank has higher existing gender diversity on its board, 
a comparable increase in gender diversity raises its Return on Assets by around 0.6 percentage points.  This 
result is consistent with the idea that board room dynamics are influenced by the number of women in the 
room. When there is a threshold share of women on the board and the bank is well managed (as proxied for 
by the Risk-weighted Capital Ratio), more gender diversity makes a positive contribution to bank 
performance. We find that the impact of increased diversity is significant and positive on Return on Assets 
at well-capitalized banks once the share of females on the board reaches around 13 percent (corresponding 
to a Blau Index of around 22). As the median Blau Index of gender diversity in our sample is 22, this implies 
that around 50 percent of well-capitalized banks in our sample enjoy the performance-enhancing effects of 
gender diversity. 
As was the case with our initial results, the positive and significant coefficients on Spread of Board 
Experience (Columns 5 and 6 of Table 3) indicate that banks with boards that show a broad range of 
experience in terms of the number of boards its members sit on, perform better. However, variance in the 
number of years of experience of board members reduces bank performance. The effects of balance sheet 
characteristics on Return on Assets point in a similar direction as in Table 2.  
 
4.2 Portfolio Risk and Board Gender Diversity 
Next, we examine the relationship between the portfolio risk of a bank, and its board’s gender diversity. 
Specifically, in Table 4 we examine (accumulated) bank portfolio risk, as represented by the Share of 
Nonperforming Assets (NPA).  Although some risks that banks take will pay off in the form of higher 
income, a higher share of nonperforming assets is an indicator of the part of a bank’s risk-taking that has 
“gone bad”. In their review of the literature, Croson and Gneezy (2009) conclude that experimental 
evidence supports the view that women are more risk-averse than men. However, in the context of banks, 
Berger et al. (2014) and Wang and Hsu (2013) document a positive relationship between risk-taking and 
gender diversity. This may be in part because gender diversity proxies for board strength, and stronger 
boards take more risks (Pathan 2009). Our results also show that greater gender diversity increases the 
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Share of Nonperforming Assets, suggesting that more gender diversity is associated with greater portfolio 
risk once the share of women on the board reaches around 7-8 percent. Once mid-capitalized banks reach 
a Blau Index of around 8 (or a female share of 4 to 5 percent) on their boards, greater gender diversity maps 
into higher NPA shares. For well-capitalized (better managed) banks, this threshold increases to a Blau 
Index of around 14 (or a female share of around 7-8 percent, corresponding to 75 percent of banks in our 
sample).  
4.3 CEO Pay and Gender Diversity 
As a final measure of bank behavior, we also examine the Ratio of CEO to Average Staff Pay.  A higher 
ratio indicates greater pay inequality within the bank.  The simple correlations reported in Table 1A indicate 
that firms with greater gender diversity do have higher pay inequality, with a positive correlation coefficient 
of 0.25. The results in Table 5 confirm that this general conclusion holds up to a host of conditioning 
variables as well as bank and year fixed effects. The first four rows of Table 5 show that the Blau Index of 
gender diversity enters positively and significantly in all specifications. As was the case with the other 
measures of bank performance, the coefficients on the interactions of the Blau Index with itself and the 
Risk-weighted Capital Ratio are also all statistically significant.   
The last two rows of Table 5 take all the interaction terms into account and show the marginal 
effect of a one standard deviation increase in the Blau Index for well-capitalized banks at low and high 
levels of gender diversity.  These marginal effects indicate that when gender diversity is low, the marginal 
effect of greater gender diversity is negative on within-bank pay inequality. But, when gender diversity is 
high, the marginal effect is positive. For well-capitalized banks, this relationship turns positive once the 
Blau Index reaches around 20, corresponding to a board female share of around 12 percent (the median 
value for banks in our sample). The magnitudes of the estimated marginal effects are notable. The results 
in the last row of Table 5 indicate that a one standard deviation increase in the Blau Index at a well-
capitalized bank in the 90th percentile of gender diversity would result in close to a one standard deviation 
increase in the Ratio of CEO to Average Staff Pay.  
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Our result is in line with anecdotal evidence that greater gender diversity on boards correspond to 
higher CEO pay (New York Times, May 27th, 2016). However, our result seems in contrast to the results 
of experimental studies described in Croson and Gneezy (2009) in which they review several studies that 
find women to be more inequality-averse than men.12 However, these studies also indicate that women’s 
revealed preferences for equal outcomes are more context-specific. It is possible that in the context of the 
board room in which social connections also play a role (Agarwal et al, 2016; Kramarz and Thesmar, 2013), 
these preferences for equality do not manifest themselves.   
We find that greater Overall Board Tenure (a measure of board experience) corresponds to greater 
Ratio of CEO to Average Staff Pay. This result is in line with Conyon (2014)’s finding that greater 
experience corresponds to higher CEO pay. Interestingly, we find that banks with higher Risk-weighted 
Capital Ratios (a proxy for the quality of management) have significantly greater gaps between the 
compensation of the CEO and their average non-executive worker. This result can be justified insofar as 
higher Risk-weighted Capital Ratios indicate better quality bank management (Mehran and Thakor, 2011; 
Bhat and Desai, 2016). 
While more research is needed to understand the relationship pay inequality and board gender 
diversity, we should point out that our estimation strategy allows us to rule out a number of possible 
theories. Specifically, because we control for bank characteristics such as Board Size and Risk-weighted 
Capital Ratio, we cannot attribute this result to larger boards being both more gender diverse and also 
compensating CEOs relatively more.13 Furthermore, our inclusion of bank fixed effects also rule out the 
hypothesis that there is some unobserved fixed characteristic of the bank that is associated both with gender 
                                                          
12 The gender of the CEO may also play a role in pay inequality: Kulich et al. (2011) find that in the UK, male 
executives earn higher and more performance sensitive bonuses than their female counterparts. 
13 Ayadi and Boujelbene (2013) find that larger boards are associated with higher CEO compensation at European 
banks. 
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diversity and CEO compensation. Similarly, year fixed effects rule out the possibility that the positive 
correlation can be attributed to an omitted variable associated with a specific time period.14   
 
4.4 Discussion 
 Overall, we find that the impact of increasing gender diversity on bank boards is context dependent.  
It depends on both the existing level of gender diversity as well as the quality of bank management (as 
proxied for by the risk-weighted capital ratio).  The result that the impact of increasing gender diversity on 
overall bank performance only turns positive when there is already more than one woman in the boardroom 
is consistent with research by political scientists who have studied the impact of the gender composition of 
legislators. For example, Karpowitz and Mendelberg (2014) find that group composition affects the 
authority of women in a variety of decision-making situations. Specifically, they document that women 
speak more frequently when the percentage of women in the group increases. Thus, our result that the 
positive impact of increasing gender diversity only occurs after a threshold level of women is on the board 
is consistent with the benefits of diverse viewpoints not being fully realized unless those viewpoints can be 
expressed with authority. 
More generally, our results support the literature that studies the economic impact of diversity and 
finds that it is context-dependent.  For example, Alesina and LaFerrara (2005) examine the impact of ethnic 
diversity on economic growth and find that it has a positive impact in high income countries and 
democracies that have the institutional capacity to mitigate the conflict that often accompanies greater 
diversity.  Several studies have shown that diverse groups are more innovative (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 
2004; Phillips et al., 2006; Freeman and Huang, 2015).   Again, our result that the quality of management 
of the bank helps to maximize the benefits of diverse and potentially more innovative view points while 
minimizing the communication costs and potential conflict are consistent with these findings. 
                                                          
14 We observe a substantial drop in the Ratio of CEO to Average Staff Pay during the 2008-2009 period, due to the 
effect of the financial crisis. As we point out, our inclusion of the year fixed effects eliminates concerns about this 
period-specific decline.  
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5. Conclusion 
Using a sample of large US banks over the 1999-2016 period, we study the relationship between 
various measures of bank performance and gender diversity on bank boards. We find that the impact of 
board gender diversity on bank performance is highly non-linear. We identify “threshold” results, which 
indicate that the relationship between bank performance and board gender diversity changes directions once 
banks increase gender diversity on their boards from low to higher levels. Our non-linearity results help 
shed light on the very wide-ranging findings of previous papers on the role of board gender diversity in 
bank (and in general, firm) performance. Our findings suggest that banks’ continued voluntary expansion 
of board gender diversity is likely to bring overall performance benefits for well-capitalized (well-managed) 
banks.  
More research is needed on understanding the relationship between gender diversity on executive 
boards, and risk-taking and pay inequality within banks. By identifying our “threshold” results, we hope 
that our work facilitates further analysis on these issues. 
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Dependent Variables
Bank Performance Measures
Return on Assets %
Net Income divided by Average Total
Assets, from Bankscope
0.96 1.32 -5.84 0.74 1.10 1.41 10.00 647
Revenue to Expense Ratio %
Total current operation revenue divided
by total current operating expenses,
multiplied by 100, from CRSP/Compustat
129.40 23.58 46.56 119.10 130.90 141.40 212.10 730
Share of Nonperforming Assets %
Nonperforming assets divided by total
assets, multiplied by 100, from
CRSP/Compustat
1.45 4.52 0.00 0.29 0.56 1.46 78.79 632
Ratio of CEO to Average Staff Pay Ratio
Chief Operating Officer compensation
(defined as Total direct compensation
plus total equity linked compensation,
from Boardex) divided by average staff
compensation (defined as the sum of
stock compensation, wages&salaries and
staff benefits, from CRSP/Compustat)
65.67 91.50 1.37 17.34 35.55 75.98 875.50 626
Explanatory Variables
Board Characteristics
Blau Index Index where P is the fraction of men and women 
on bank boards, and g indexes gender.
Based on Blau (1977), calculated from
Boardex
Female Share of Board %
Percent share of board that is comprised
on women, from Boardex
12.55 8.35 0.00 7.69 12.50 16.67 42.86 730
Average Wealth of Board Members Natural Logarithm
Natural logarithm of average value
(across all board members) of cumulative
holdings over time of stock, options, and
LTIPs, in 1000 USD, from Boardex
8.27 1.13 3.53 7.59 8.23 8.94 12.13 676
Average Age of Board Members Natural Logarithm
Average of board members’ age in the
given year, from Boardex
4.13 0.05 3.93 4.09 4.13 4.16 4.30 730
11.94 0.00 14.20
Table 1: Variable Descriptions and Summary Statistics
21.88 27.78 48.98 730
VARIABLE NAME UNIT DEFINITION MEAN SD MIN P25 P50 P75 MAX N
20.55
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Explanatory Variables
Board Characteristics continued
Average Bank Board Tenure Natural Logarithm
Natural logarithm of average number of years that
board members have spent on bank boards, to date,
from Boardex
1.85 0.30 1.15 1.61 1.88 2.09 2.58 730
Spread of Bank Board Tenure Natural Logarithm
Natural logarithm of the difference between the
average and median bank board tenure to date,
divided by the median, from Boardex
-0.09 0.16 -0.31 -0.18 -0.11 -0.04 1.46 730
Average Board Experience Natural Logarithm
Natural Logarithm of average number of company
boards (private, quoted or other) that board
members have served on over their careers, to date,
from Boardex
1.73 0.34 0.96 1.48 1.72 1.99 2.47 730
Spread of Board Experience Natural Logarithm
Natural logarithm of the difference between the
average and median board experience to date,
divided by the median, from Boardex
0.16 0.23 -0.25 -0.01 0.11 0.26 1.31 730
Average Overall Board Tenure Natural Logarithm
Average number of years board members have sat
on a board of a publicly listed company, to date,
from Boardex
2.30 0.33 1.00 2.10 2.32 2.53 3.12 730
Spread of Overall Board Tenure Natural Logarithm
Natural logarithm of the difference between the
average and median overall board tenure to date,
divided by the median, from Boardex
0.19 0.41 -0.38 -0.05 0.10 0.27 5.02 730
Size of Board Natural Logarithm Total number of board members 13.10 3.67 6.00 11.00 13.00 15.00 32.00 730
Share of Independent Directors on Board %
Used as instrument for Gender Diversity, defined as
the Percent share of board members who are
categorized as "Independent Directors", from
Boardex
72.75 11.31 22.22 65.00 73.33 81.82 93.75 730
Bank Balance Sheet Characteristics
Loan to Deposit Ratio Ratio
Total Loans divided by Total Deposits, from
CRSP/Compustat
0.91 0.22 0.06 0.81 0.92 1.02 2.24 730
Acquisiton Dummy 0/1
Dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if the
bank experienced an acquisition in the given year, 0
otherwise, from CRSP/Compustat
0.39 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 730
Risk-Weighted Capital Ratio %
Risk-weighted capital to asset ratio, from
CRSP/Compustat
13.72 2.97 4.53 11.79 13.13 14.78 48.20 720
MIN
Table 1 continued: Variable Descriptions and Summary Statistics
VARIABLE NAME UNIT DEFINITION MEAN SD P25 P50 P75 MAX N
Gender Diversity
Blau Index {t-1} 3.790** 3.715** 3.489** 3.383** 3.152* 3.013* 3.506** 3.211*
[1.672] [1.724] [1.661] [1.712] [1.675] [1.728] [1.652] [1.701]
Blau Index {t-1} * Risk-Weighted 
Capital Ratio {t-1} -0.327*** -0.325*** -0.300** -0.296** -0.276** -0.269** -0.306*** -0.290**
[0.119] [0.123] [0.118] [0.122] [0.119] [0.123] [0.118] [0.122]
Blau Index {t-1} * Blau Index {t-1} -0.0752** -0.0744** -0.0665* -0.0652* -0.0597* -0.0576 -0.0692** -0.0645*
[0.0351] [0.0357] [0.0349] [0.0355] [0.0353] [0.0360] [0.0346] [0.0352]
Blau Index {t-1} * Blau Index {t-1} * 
Risk-Weighted Capital Ratio {t-1} 0.00639** 0.00635** 0.00561** 0.00555** 0.00523** 0.00511** 0.00594** 0.00563**
[0.00250] [0.00255] [0.00249] [0.00254] [0.00252] [0.00257] [0.00247] [0.00252]
Board Characteristics
Average Wealth of Board Members {t-1} -0.158 -0.318 0.11 -0.269
[1.016] [1.015] [1.007] [1.016]
Average Age of Board Members {t-1} -3.638 10.11 -7.631 -6.227
[26.14] [28.34] [25.89] [31.10]
Average Bank Board Tenure {t-1} -3.84 -4.982
[8.276] [9.041]
Spread of Bank Board Tenure {t-1} -15.30*** -15.51***
[4.573] [4.610]
Average Board Experience {t-1} 13.77* 13.87*
[7.458] [7.488]
Spread of Board Experience {t-1} 10.54*** 10.63***
[3.292] [3.306]
Average Overall Board Tenure {t-1} -1.417 -0.612
[4.182] [5.003]
Spread of Overall Board Tenure {t-1} -3.672** -3.647**
[1.557] [1.561]
Bank Characteristics
Acquisition Dummy {t-1} -3.034** -2.916** -3.195*** -3.123*** -3.008** -2.904** -2.900** -2.804**
[1.214] [1.215] [1.208] [1.209] [1.203] [1.204] [1.210] [1.211]
Loan to Deposit Ratio {t-1} -19.27*** -19.02*** -18.36*** -17.94*** -18.73*** -18.51*** -19.62*** -19.32***
[6.615] [6.624] [6.576] [6.585] [6.542] [6.550] [6.597] [6.604]
Board Size {t-1} -0.205 -0.197 -0.36 -0.388 -0.312 -0.299 -0.186 -0.171
[0.321] [0.323] [0.337] [0.347] [0.322] [0.324] [0.323] [0.329]
Risk-Weighted Capital Ratio {t-1} 3.109** 3.119** 2.928** 2.902** 2.717** 2.683** 2.901** 2.771**
[1.215] [1.286] [1.207] [1.277] [1.212] [1.283] [1.209] [1.280]
Constant -0.408 -0.362 0.213 0.374 -0.723 -0.657 -0.31 -0.264
[0.848] [0.858] [1.454] [1.511] [0.849] [0.857] [0.851] [0.857]
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 730 729 730 729 730 729 729 728
Number of Banks 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87
R-squared - within 0.53 0.53 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.54 0.53 0.53
R-squared - between 0.33 0.03 0.03 0.78 0.7 0.01 0.12 0.55
R-squared - overall 0.24 0.24 0.26 0.26 0.22 0.22 0.25 0.24
10th percentile): -22.10 -22.50 -20.10 -20.50 -19.10 -19.40 -21.10 -21.20
[7.2]*** [7.3]*** [7.15]*** [7.3]*** [7.2]*** [7.4]*** [7.2]*** [7.4]***
90th percentile): 7.80 7.60 5.80 5.60 7.00 6.70 7.40 6.70
[5.1] [5.1] [5.1] [5.1] [5.0] [5.1] [5.0] [5.1]
Notes: This table shows the results of Instrumental Variables regressions. The dependent variable is banks' Revenue to Expense Ratio. The explanatory
variables are as described in Table 1. The coefficients describe the impact of a one-unit increase in the explanatory variable on percentage points changes in
banks' Revenue to Expense Ratio. All regressions contain bank and year fixed effects. The instrumented variable is the Blau Index measure of gender
diversity. The set of instuments consists of: the share of independent directors, bank and year fixed effects, and the 1999 (beginning of sample) value of the
Blau Index interacted with the year dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2: The Role of Gender Diversity, Board Experience and Balance Sheet Traits in Determining US Banks' Revenue to Expense Ratio 1999 - 2015
Marginal effect of a one standard deviation increase in the Blau index, for well-capitalized banks (at the 90th percentile) with low Blau index (at the
Marginal effect of a one standard deviation increase in the Blau index, for well-capitalized banks (at the 90th percentile) with high Blau index (at the
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]VARIABLES
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Gender Diversity
Blau Index {t-1} 0.289*** 0.276** 0.285*** 0.270** 0.273** 0.257** 0.285*** 0.272**
[0.106] [0.110] [0.106] [0.110] [0.107] [0.111] [0.104] [0.108]
Blau Index {t-1} * Risk-Weighted 
Capital Ratio {t-1} -0.0215*** -0.0207*** -0.0213*** -0.0204*** -0.0200*** -0.0190** -0.0210*** -0.0202***
[0.00751] [0.00783] [0.00753] [0.00784] [0.00760] [0.00792] [0.00745] [0.00778]
Blau Index {t-1} * Blau Index {t-1} -0.00619*** -0.00598*** -0.00603*** -0.00581** -0.00593*** -0.00567** -0.00612*** -0.00591***
[0.00221] [0.00226] [0.00222] [0.00227] [0.00224] [0.00229] [0.00218] [0.00223]
Blau Index {t-1} * Blau Index {t-1} * 
Risk-Weighted Capital Ratio {t-1} 0.000467*** 0.000453*** 0.000455*** 0.000442*** 0.000441*** 0.000424*** 0.000457*** 0.000444***
[0.000158] [0.000162] [0.000158] [0.000162] [0.000160] [0.000164] [0.000156] [0.000160]
Board Characteristics
Average Wealth of Board Members {t-1} -0.0114 -0.0116 -0.0000966 -0.0129
[0.0769] [0.0777] [0.0767] [0.0768]
Average Age of Board Members {t-1} -0.439 -0.106 -0.356 0.558
[1.697] [1.854] [1.696] [2.012]
Average Bank Board Tenure {t-1} -0.185 -0.144
[0.542] [0.593]
Spread of Bank Board Tenure {t-1} -0.408 -0.4
[0.310] [0.313]
Average Board Experience {t-1} -0.233 -0.232
[0.498] [0.499]
Spread of Board Experience {t-1} 0.458** 0.465**
[0.218] [0.218]
Average Overall Board Tenure {t-1} -0.366 -0.393
[0.272] [0.325]
Spread of Overall Board Tenure {t-1} -0.298*** -0.297***
[0.101] [0.101]
Bank Characteristics
Acquisition Dummy {t-1} -0.149* -0.136* -0.153* -0.141* -0.138* -0.126 -0.136* -0.126
[0.0796] [0.0795] [0.0797] [0.0796] [0.0795] [0.0794] [0.0792] [0.0792]
Loan to Deposit Ratio {t-1} -0.814* -0.793* -0.793* -0.767* -0.829* -0.809* -0.848* -0.820*
[0.438] [0.438] [0.438] [0.438] [0.436] [0.436] [0.436] [0.435]
Board Size {t-1} 0.0047 0.00626 -0.00112 0.000448 -0.00299 -0.00169 0.00374 0.00329
[0.0221] [0.0223] [0.0233] [0.0243] [0.0223] [0.0226] [0.0221] [0.0226]
Risk-Weighted Capital Ratio {t-1} 0.183** 0.178** 0.183** 0.178** 0.169** 0.163** 0.176** 0.170**
[0.0760] [0.0811] [0.0760] [0.0812] [0.0763] [0.0815] [0.0757] [0.0810]
Constant -0.0879 -0.0843 -0.058 -0.0609 -0.0884 -0.0847 -0.0734 -0.0733
[0.0549] [0.0554] [0.0939] [0.0981] [0.0552] [0.0557] [0.0549] [0.0552]
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 632 631 632 631 632 631 631 630
Number of Banks 82 81 82 81 82 81 82 81
R-squared - within 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.35
R-squared - between 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.14 0.02 0.1
R-squared - overall 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.12
10th percentile): -0.97 -0.96 -0.98 -0.98 -0.85 -0.84 -0.91 -0.9
[0.46]** [0.47]** [0.46]** [0.47]** [0.46]* [0.47]* [0.46]** [0.47]*
90th percentile): 0.62 0.6 0.58 0.56 0.59 0.56 0.6 0.6
[0.32]* [0.32]* [0.33]* [0.33]** [0.32]* [0.32]* [0.32]** [0.32]**
Notes: This table shows the results of Instrumental Variables regressions. The dependent variable is banks' Return on Assets. The explanatory variables
are as described in Table 1. The coefficients describe the impact of a one-unit increase in the explanatory variable on percentage points changes in banks'
Return on Assets. All regressions contain bank and year fixed effects. The instrumented variable is the Blau Indexmeasure of gender diversity. The set of
instuments consists of: the share of independent directors, bank and year fixed effects, and the 1999 (beginning of sample) value of the Blau Index
interacted with the year dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3:  The Role of Gender Diversity, Board Experience and Balance Sheet Traits in Determining US Banks' Return on Assets 1999 - 2015
Marginal effect of a one standard deviation increase in the Blau index, for well-capitalized banks (at the 90th percentile) with low Blau index (at the
Marginal effect of a one standard deviation increase in the Blau index, for well-capitalized banks (at the 90th percentile) with high Blau index (at the
VARIABLES [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
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Gender Diversity
Blau Index {t-1} -0.354* -0.366* -0.356* -0.374* -0.338* -0.342* -0.345* -0.337*
[0.193] [0.201] [0.193] [0.201] [0.196] [0.204] [0.192] [0.201]
Blau Index {t-1} * Risk-Weighted 
Capital Ratio {t-1} 0.0182 0.0197 0.0186 0.0207 0.017 0.018 0.0176 0.0178
[0.0137] [0.0144] [0.0137] [0.0144] [0.0140] [0.0146] [0.0137] [0.0144]
Blau Index {t-1} * Blau Index {t-1} 0.00898** 0.00930** 0.00919** 0.00967** 0.00863** 0.00879** 0.00881** 0.00874**
[0.00403] [0.00413] [0.00403] [0.00413] [0.00410] [0.00421] [0.00401] [0.00412]
Blau Index {t-1} * Blau Index {t-1} * 
Risk-Weighted Capital Ratio {t-1} -0.000372 -0.000395 -0.000391 -0.00043 -0.000349 -0.000362 -0.00036 -0.000358
[0.000286] [0.000295] [0.000287] [0.000295] [0.000291] [0.000300] [0.000285] [0.000294]
Board Characteristics
Average Wealth of Board Members {t-1} -0.0496 -0.0559 -0.0552 -0.0522
[0.141] [0.142] [0.141] [0.142]
Average Age of Board Members {t-1} 6.187** 6.627* 6.268** 6.071
[3.099] [3.391] [3.106] [3.730]
Average Bank Board Tenure {t-1} 0.948 0.0533
[1.063] [1.166]
Spread of Bank Board Tenure {t-1} -0.833 -0.949
[0.632] [0.636]
Average Board Experience {t-1} -0.173 -0.319
[0.915] [0.919]
Spread of Board Experience {t-1} -0.174 -0.181
[0.398] [0.400]
Average Overall Board Tenure {t-1} 0.614 0.0629
[0.512] [0.618]
Spread of Overall Board Tenure {t-1} -0.0402 -0.0496
[0.185] [0.186]
Bank Characteristics
Acquisition Dummy {t-1} 0.147 0.124 0.153 0.125 0.145 0.125 0.15 0.127
[0.145] [0.146] [0.145] [0.146] [0.146] [0.146] [0.146] [0.146]
Loan to Deposit Ratio {t-1} -0.285 -0.252 -0.233 -0.212 -0.29 -0.262 -0.27 -0.267
[0.794] [0.796] [0.794] [0.795] [0.795] [0.796] [0.796] [0.798]
Board Size {t-1} -0.028 -0.0403 -0.0216 -0.0473 -0.0265 -0.0397 -0.0243 -0.0403
[0.0401] [0.0406] [0.0425] [0.0444] [0.0408] [0.0413] [0.0405] [0.0417]
Risk-Weighted Capital Ratio {t-1} -0.177 -0.202 -0.177 -0.206 -0.166 -0.187 -0.171 -0.184
[0.138] [0.148] [0.138] [0.148] [0.140] [0.150] [0.139] [0.149]
Constant 0.022 -0.00767 -0.106 -0.0126 0.0283 0.0012 0.00923 -0.01
[0.108] [0.109] [0.185] [0.193] [0.110] [0.111] [0.109] [0.110]
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 615 614 615 614 615 614 614 613
Number of Banks 82 81 82 81 82 81 82 81
R-squared - within 0.32 0.33 0.36 0.34 0.31 0.33 0.33 0.34
R-squared - between 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
R-squared - overall 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
 10th percentile): -0.48 -0.32 -0.42 -0.21 -0.53 -0.38 -0.50 -0.35
[0.83] [0.86] [0.84] [0.86] [0.84] [0.87] [0.84] [0.87]
 90th percentile): 1.70 1.80 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.80 1.70 1.90
[0.59]*** [0.60]*** [0.60]*** [0.60]*** [0.59]*** [0.60]*** [0.59]*** [0.60]***
Notes: This table shows the results of Instrumental Variables regressions. The dependent variable is banks' Share of Nonperforming Assets. The
explanatory variables are as described in Table 1. The coefficients describe the impact of a one-unit increase in the explanatory variable on percentage
points changes in banks' Share of Nonperforming Assets. All regressions contain bank and year fixed effects. The instrumented variable is the Blau Index
measure of gender diversity. The set of instuments consists of: the share of independent directors, bank and year fixed effects, and the 1999 (beginning of
sample) value of the Blau Index interacted with the year dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4:  The Role of Gender Diversity, Board Experience and Balance Sheet Traits in Determining US Banks' Share of Nonperforming Assets 1999 - 2015
Marginal effect of a one standard deviation increase in the Blau index, for well-capitalized banks (at the 90th percentile) with low Blau index (at the
Marginal effect of a one standard deviation increase in the Blau index, for well-capitalized banks (at the 90th percentile) with high Blau index (at the
VARIABLES [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
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Gender Diversity
Blau Index {t-1} 33.05*** 32.67*** 32.82*** 32.39*** 33.45*** 33.29*** 31.34*** 28.67***
[9.001] [9.017] [9.000] [9.006] [9.162] [9.183] [8.915] [8.831]
Blau Index {t-1} * Risk-Weighted 
Capital Ratio {t-1} -2.400*** -2.366*** -2.387*** -2.350*** -2.425*** -2.405*** -2.273*** -2.091***
[0.665] [0.667] [0.665] [0.666] [0.678] [0.680] [0.660] [0.656]
Blau Index {t-1} * Blau Index {t-1} -0.714*** -0.706*** -0.712*** -0.703*** -0.737*** -0.732*** -0.669*** -0.619***
[0.197] [0.197] [0.197] [0.197] [0.202] [0.202] [0.195] [0.193]
Blau Index {t-1} * Blau Index {t-1} * 
Risk-Weighted Capital Ratio {t-1} 0.0534*** 0.0526*** 0.0533*** 0.0525*** 0.0546*** 0.0541*** 0.0501*** 0.0462***
[0.0143] [0.0143] [0.0144] [0.0144] [0.0147] [0.0147] [0.0142] [0.0141]
Board Characteristics
Average Wealth of Board Members {t-1} -5.923 -5.944 -6.359 -6.85
[5.791] [5.835] [5.806] [5.760]
Average Age of Board Members {t-1} -22.73 -33.24 -12.43 -268.6
[150.8] [164.7] [151.1] [182.5]
Average Bank Board Tenure {t-1} -1.473 6.393
[51.24] [55.50]
Spread of Bank Board Tenure {t-1} 3.024 1.351
[27.83] [28.06]
Average Board Experience {t-1} -57.63 -58.77
[43.15] [43.23]
Spread of Board Experience {t-1} -6.499 -8.026
[19.10] [19.15]
Average Overall Board Tenure {t-1} 44.14* 69.26**
[24.21] [29.33]
Spread of Overall Board Tenure {t-1} 0.305 -0.375
[8.664] [8.624]
Bank Characteristics
Acquisition Dummy {t-1} 8.296 8.042 8.3 8.115 8.81 8.529 8.82 9.087
[7.208] [7.212] [7.231] [7.241] [7.213] [7.221] [7.197] [7.158]
Loan to Deposit Ratio {t-1} 0.962 0.708 0.918 0.558 -0.802 -1.041 -3.132 -5.802
[40.18] [40.17] [40.29] [40.31] [40.17] [40.17] [40.13] [39.88]
Board Size {t-1} 1.772 1.679 1.776 1.779 1.774 1.678 1.945 2.381
[1.800] [1.820] [1.902] [1.974] [1.825] [1.844] [1.808] [1.838]
Risk-Weighted Capital Ratio {t-1} 21.84*** 21.55*** 21.65*** 21.33*** 21.82*** 21.65*** 20.85*** 19.30***
[6.987] [6.997] [6.977] [6.982] [7.043] [7.055] [6.964] [6.914]
Constant -9.192* -9.294* -8.972 -10.16 -8.393 -8.527 -9.998* -9.455*
[5.126] [5.166] [9.009] [9.307] [5.157] [5.193] [5.134] [5.121]
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 609 609 609 609 609 609 608 608
Number of Banks 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86
R-squared - within 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
R-squared - between 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.08 0.03 0.12 0.13
R-squared - overall 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01
 10th percentile): -99.10 -99.66 -99.20 -96.80 -99.50 -97.40 -93.50 -87.80
[44.4]** [44.4]** [44.2]** [44.2]** [44.9]** [44.8]** [44.3]** [44.1]**
 90th percentile): 77.70 75.90 77.90 75.30 76.30 75.00 73.90 64.50
[29.8]** [29.7]*** [30.1]*** [29.9]*** [29.9]*** [29.9]*** [29.7]** [29.5]**
Notes: This table shows the results of Instrumental Variables regressions. The dependent variable is banks' Ratio of CEO To Average Staff Pay. The
explanatory variables are as described in Table 1. The coefficients describe the impact of a one-unit increase in the explanatory variable on percentage
points changes in banks' Ratio of CEO To Average Staff Pay. All regressions contain bank and year fixed effects. The instrumented variable is the Blau Index 
measure of gender diversity. The set of instuments consists of: the share of independent directors, bank and year fixed effects, and the 1999 (beginning of
sample) value of Blau Index interacted with the year dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 Table 5: The Role of Gender Diversity, Board Experience and Balance Sheet Traits in Determining US Banks' Ratio of CEO To Average Staff Pay 1999 - 2015
Marginal effect of a one standard deviation increase in the Blau index, for well-capitalized banks (at the 90th percentile) with low Blau index (at the
Marginal effect of a one standard deviation increase in the Blau index, for well-capitalized banks (at the 90th percentile) with high Blau index (at the
VARIABLES [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
  
VARIABLES
Return on 
Average 
Assets
Revenue 
to Expense 
Ratio
Share of 
Nonperfor
ming 
Assets
Ratio of 
CEO to 
Average 
Staff Pay
Female 
Share of 
Board
Blau Index
Average 
Wealth of 
Board 
Members
Average 
Age of 
Board 
Members
Average 
Bank 
Board 
Tenure
Average 
Board 
Experience
Average 
Overall 
Board 
Tenure
Spread of 
Bank 
Board 
Tenure
Spread of 
Board 
Experience
Spread of 
Overall 
Board 
Tenure
Size of 
Board
Share of 
Independe
nt 
Directors 
on Board
Loan to 
Deposit 
Ratio
Acquisito
n Dummy
Total 
Assets
Risk-
Weighted 
Capital 
Ratio
Return on Average 
Assets
1
Revenue to Expense 
Ratio
0.69 1
Share of 
Nonperforming 
Assets
-0.14 -0.18 1
Ratio of CEO to 
Average Staff Pay
0.39 0.07 0.24 1
Female Share of 
Board
0.14 0 0.07 0.27 1
Blau Index 0.1 -0.02 0.07 0.25 0.99 1
Average Wealth of 
Board Members
0.45 0.42 -0.01 0.33 0.02 0.01 1
Average Age of 
Board Members
-0.01 0.12 0.06 0.03 -0.17 -0.18 0.09 1
Average Bank Board 
Tenure
-0.26 -0.33 0.14 0.04 0.13 0.13 -0.07 0.31 1
Average Board 
Experience
0.08 -0.09 0.15 0.34 0.19 0.21 0.25 -0.01 0.11 1
Average Overall 
Board Tenure
-0.05 0.06 -0.07 -0.15 -0.19 -0.19 0.09 0.42 0.33 -0.13 1
Spread of Bank 
Board Tenure
0.04 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.06 0.05 -0.04 0.04 -0.1 0.08 -0.19 1
Spread of Board 
Experience
-0.08 -0.04 0.02 -0.06 0.03 0.06 -0.07 -0.09 0 0.01 -0.11 0.01 1
Spread of Overall 
Board Tenure
-0.05 -0.06 0.01 -0.03 0.03 0.04 -0.02 -0.06 -0.09 0.06 -0.16 0.22 -0.01 1
Size of Board 0.12 0 0.04 0.17 0.03 0.06 0.24 0.06 -0.12 0.2 -0.08 0.02 -0.02 0.08 1
Share of 
Independent 
Directors on Board
0.04 -0.03 0.04 0.2 0.19 0.19 -0.16 -0.04 0.17 0.25 0 0.07 0 0.02 0.03 1
Loan to Deposit 
Ratio
0 -0.05 0.01 -0.04 -0.08 -0.08 -0.04 0.12 0.05 -0.09 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 -0.06 -0.08 -0.17 1
Acquisiton Dummy 0.02 -0.06 0.07 0.12 0.15 0.16 0.06 0.02 0.28 0.2 -0.02 -0.04 0.01 0.07 0.11 0.16 -0.05 1
Total Assets 0.07 -0.1 -0.05 0.39 0.27 0.29 0.39 0.02 0.25 0.47 -0.05 0.11 0.03 -0.01 0.35 0.31 -0.07 0.21 1
Risk-Weighted 
Capital Ratio
-0.04 0.06 -0.02 -0.05 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.19 0.11 -0.03 0.01 0.08 0.12 -0.01 -0.14 -0.03 -0.13 -0.15 0.08 1
Table 1A: Correlation Matrix
[AO1] 
 
Board Characteristics
Average Wealth of Board Members {t-1} 0.367 0.473 0.4 0.324
[0.56] [0.566] [0.563] [0.561]
Average Age of Board Members {t-1} -47.489 -40.393 -47.129 -62.75
[12.231]*** [13.414]*** [12.284]*** [14.202]***
Average Bank Board Tenure {t-1} -11.204 -6.057
[4.179]*** [4.584]
Spread of Bank Board Tenure {t-1} 0.364 0.779
[2.417] [2.404]
Average Board Experience {t-1} -2.005 -1.016
[3.655] [3.609]
Spread of Board Experience {t-1} 1.088 1.066
[1.535] [1.519]
Average Overall Board Tenure {t-1} -0.018 5.051
[2.018] [2.3]**
Spread of Overall Board Tenure {t-1} 0.891 0.965
[0.671] [0.657]
Bank Characteristics
Acquisition Dummy {t-1} -1.274 -1.234 -1.351 -1.278 -1.235 -1.205 -1.296 -1.214
[0.57]** [0.566]** [0.568]** [0.568]** [0.573]** [0.568]** [0.572]** [0.564]**
Loan to Deposit Ratio {t-1} 4.066 3.642 4.361 3.844 4.048 3.689 4.014 3.468
[3.122] [3.092] [3.129] [3.124] [3.133] [3.104] [3.129] [3.082]
Board Size {t-1} -0.021 -0.004 -0.232 -0.118 -0.035 -0.017 -0.062 0.035
[0.187] [0.185] [0.202] [0.205] [0.188] [0.186] [0.192] [0.189]
Risk-Weighted Capital Ratio {t-1} 0.108 0.07 0.097 0.07 0.108 0.071 0.115 0.089
[0.129] [0.129] [0.128] [0.129] [0.129] [0.129] [0.129] [0.129]
Share of Independent Directors {t-1} 0.077 0.071 0.057 0.063 0.077 0.072 0.078 0.085
[0.042]* [0.041]* [0.042] [0.042] [0.042]* [0.041]* [0.042]* [0.042]**
Constant 0.091 -0.234 0.217 0.126 0.112 -0.221 -0.547 0.364
[1.536] [1.524] [1.573] [1.569] [1.539] [1.528] [1.545] [1.51]
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects * Blau Index {1999} Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 635 634 635 634 635 634 634 633
P-Value of Sargan Test Statistic 0.0771 0.0722 0.0485 0.0402 0.0465 0.0448 0.0628 0.0567
R-squared 0.41 0.44 0.43 0.44 0.42 0.44 0.42 0.45
Table 2A: First-stage IV Results for Revenue to Expense Ratio Regressions
 The Role Board Experience and Balance Sheet Traits in Determining US Banks' Blau Index 1999 - 2015
VARIABLES [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
 
Notes: This table shows the results of the first stage of 2SLS Instrumental Variables regressions, corresponding to the Revenue to Assets 
Ratio results described in Table 2. The dependent variable is banks' Blau Index of board diversity. The explanatory variables are as 
described in Table 1.  The coefficients describe the impact of a one-unit increase in the explanatory variable on unit changes in banks' 
Blau Index of board diversity. As shown, the set of instruments consists of: bank and year fixed effects, the share of independent 
directors, bank and year fixed effects, and the 1999 (beginning of sample) value of Blau Index interacted with the year dummies. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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